When a litigant seeks to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), there are two issues that must be resolved: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate; and, if so, (2) whether the dispute at issue falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  The Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision in Airbnb, Inc. v. Doe, deals with who decides this second issue—the court or an arbitrator.

In Airbnb, a couple sued Airbnb and Wayne Natt (the property owner) for issues arising out of their stay at Natt’s condominium, which was listed for rent on Airbnb’s website.  Airbnb moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the couple was required to arbitrate their claims because Airbnb’s Terms of Service included an arbitration provision that integrated the AAA Rules.  All parties agreed that the couple was bound by the arbitration agreement—the issue then became whether the court or the arbitrator should decide if the couple’s claims against Airbnb were arbitrable.

Last week, the Florida Supreme Court adopted section 90.5021, Fla. Stat. – Florida’s fiduciary lawyer-client privilege – to the extent it is procedural and held that the decision is retroactive to the Florida legislature’s enactment of the statute in 2011.

The statute provides for application of the lawyer-client privilege when that client is a fiduciary, such as a trustee, personal representative or executor, or guardian.

On July 11, 2017, the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of a case in which it is expected to finally decide, conclusively, whether Florida courts are to apply the Frye or Daubert standard to determine admissibility of expert or scientific evidence.

The Frye standard, which was adopted in Florida in 1952, applies to expert testimony based upon new or novel scientific evidence. Under the Frye standard, “in order to introduce expert testimony deduced from a scientific principle or discovery, the principle or discovery ‘must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’”

In 2011, Florida’s legislature enacted section 90.5021, Fla. Stat., which provides for application of the lawyer-client privilege – even when the client is a fiduciary.

Specifically, the statute protects communications between a lawyer, on the one hand, and a client who is a trustee, personal representative or executor, or guardian, on the other hand. The privilege applies to the same extent as if the client were not acting as a fiduciary.

Why the need for a specialized statute? Isn’t the standard lawyer-client privilege statute good enough to protect communications between a lawyer and a fiduciary?