Settlements

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On September 25, in a landmark resolution that underscores the FTC’s renewed focus on digital consumer protection, Amazon agreed to pay $2.5 billion—including a $1 billion civil penalty and $1.5 billion in consumer refunds—under the Settlement Order in FTC v. Amazon.  The case, brought before Judge John H. Chun in the Western District of Washington, targeted Amazon’s Prime subscription program, alleging that the company enrolled consumers without proper consent and made cancellation unnecessarily difficult, in violation of the FTC Act and the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA).

As the culmination of an SEC investigation into Under Armour Inc.’s “pull forward” practice leads to charges, Under Armour agrees to cease and desist and settles for $9 million.

Following an investigation dating back to 2015, the SEC claimed Under Armour misled investors by not disclosing the reason for…

Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) with the hope of preventing abuse in class action lawsuits. CAFA assigns jurisdiction to federal courts over class actions where: (i) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars ($5,000,000); (ii) the class comprises at least 100 plaintiffs; and (iii) there is at least “minimal diversity” between the parties (i.e., at least one plaintiff class member is diverse from at least one defendant). In addition, CAFA mandates that courts apply greater scrutiny to class action settlements and, in particular, those involving coupons (i.e., vouchers or other non-cash disbursements which can be redeemed for (typically discounted) products or services).[1]

When drafting settlement agreements, most lawyers give due attention to the scope of any release clause. And for good reason: for defendants, the extent to which the release protects against future litigation is critical, and for plaintiffs, the extent to which it preserves future claims may be equally critical. But lawyers – and particularly those representing plaintiffs – should also give thoughtful attention to the timing of a release clause in any settlement agreement. Otherwise, a plaintiff may find that its “compromise” was nothing more than a unilateral agreement to reduce the value of its claim.

The recent case of Jarvis v. BMW of North America, LLC is an important reminder to attorneys to avoid inadvertently reaching a settlement agreement that is unacceptable to the client, or equally problematic, one that is missing critical (but not legally “essential”) terms and conditions. In Jarvis, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the defendant’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement that had been negotiated by the parties through their respective counsel – even though the plaintiffs refused to sign the agreement.

Imagine this scenario: after years of litigation in federal court, your client reaches a settlement agreement with the opposing party. The lawsuit is dismissed pursuant to the settlement agreement and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). When the opposing party breaches the settlement agreement, you promptly file a motion to compel enforcement – only to have your motion denied for lack of jurisdiction.

Accept an unpalatable offer, or reject it and risk getting much less (or even nothing)? This is the choice stakeholders in chapter 11 bankruptcies increasingly face as a result of the proliferation of “deathtrap” provisions in plans of reorganization. For example, a class of bondholders may be forced to decide between accepting 60 cents on the dollar if they vote to accept a plan, or 40 cents if they reject. A class of equityholders may have to decide between accepting equity warrants, or rejecting and getting nothing. Adding to the paralysis of being confronted with a deathtrap is the reality that there is surprisingly little authority on whether, and under what conditions, such provisions are enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code. The authorities that do exist are split on this question—emboldening debtors seeking to precipitate chapter 11 settlements while leaving impaired classes of stakeholders to decry deathtraps as “draconian” and “coercive” mechanisms.

We wrote here previously regarding the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Shane Group v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan vacating a class action settlement because the district court improperly refused to unseal the parties’ substantive filings. In revisiting the district court’s sealing orders, the Court of Appeals found that the parties’ cursory justifications for their sealing requests were “patently inadequate.” And based on this failure to elucidate reasons for sealing, the Sixth Circuit vacated every one of the district court’s sealing orders. Since its decision in June, the Sixth Circuit had occasion to interpret and apply Shane Group, and in doing so, offered key learnings for litigants seeking to toe the line for compliance with the Sixth Circuit’s newly-pronounced standard.