Settlement Agreement

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When drafting settlement agreements, most lawyers give due attention to the scope of any release clause. And for good reason: for defendants, the extent to which the release protects against future litigation is critical, and for plaintiffs, the extent to which it preserves future claims may be equally critical. But lawyers – and particularly those representing plaintiffs – should also give thoughtful attention to the timing of a release clause in any settlement agreement. Otherwise, a plaintiff may find that its “compromise” was nothing more than a unilateral agreement to reduce the value of its claim.

The recent case of Jarvis v. BMW of North America, LLC is an important reminder to attorneys to avoid inadvertently reaching a settlement agreement that is unacceptable to the client, or equally problematic, one that is missing critical (but not legally “essential”) terms and conditions. In Jarvis, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the defendant’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement that had been negotiated by the parties through their respective counsel – even though the plaintiffs refused to sign the agreement.

Imagine this scenario: after years of litigation in federal court, your client reaches a settlement agreement with the opposing party. The lawsuit is dismissed pursuant to the settlement agreement and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). When the opposing party breaches the settlement agreement, you promptly file a motion to compel enforcement – only to have your motion denied for lack of jurisdiction.

Settlement agreements often include broad general releases covering claims existing from the “beginning of the world” to the settlement date – whether the claims are known or unknown to the releasing party. And in many states, such broad releases are valid and enforceable. Indeed, it is the peace provided by such releases that often makes settlement possible.

In Hartford Accident and Indemnity v. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance et al., the Eleventh Circuit recently reversed a District Court’s decision refusing to vacate its prior judgments even though vacatur was a condition of a settlement agreement negotiated between two litigating parties. The Eleventh Circuit found the District Court abused its discretion and misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Company v. Bonner Mall Partnership, which sets out an equitable approach that generally counsels against granting requests for vacatur made after the parties settle, absent exceptional circumstances. The Eleventh Circuit decision is consistent with analyses out of the First and Second Circuits.

In Jinnaras v. Alfant, decided on May 5, 2016, the New York Court of Appeals rejected a proposed settlement of a shareholder class action, where the proposed settlement would have deprived out-of-state class members of a “cognizable property interest” by failing to provide a mechanism for class members residing…

When settling a case, litigators are naturally focused on avoiding “Round 2” of the litigation for their clients. Toward this goal, lawyers avoid drafting settlement agreements that include any sort of representations or warranties that could form the basis of a future claim against their own client. But as the recent Florida case of Moriber v. Dreiling confirms, under Florida law, if a party doesn’t specifically incorporate the representations made by an adversary into the settlement agreement, those representations are as good as gone – as well as any potential recourse if they prove untrue. Indeed, the Florida appellate court’s advice on this issue could not be clearer: when settling a case based on the existence or non-existence of some fact, deal with it specifically in the written settlement agreement.